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Abstract 
One of the stated objectives of recent ‘mega’ preferential trade agreements (PTAs) being negotiated by 
large trading powers is to address the trade-impeding effects of differences in national regulation. Past 
experience demonstrates there are serious limitations in what can be achieved in PTAs even in 
instances where there is a high level of trust among the countries involved. The disappointing results 
of the European Union’s “Internal Market” illustrate the challenge of using PTAs to integrate markets. 
This paper argues that some systemic errors were made in the way the EU Internal Market was 
negotiated. The two main instruments used to build the EU Internal Market—harmonization and 
mutual recognition—are of limited usefulness for integrating modern economies. An alternative 
instrument—mutual equivalence—is a much more promising instrument not only for the EU but also 
for the mega-PTAs currently under negotiation. 
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Introduction* 
The Bali WTO Ministerial may have been a successful exercise in “declaring victory and leave”, but 
there are few hopes that the huge rest of the Doha Agenda will be subjected to negotiations in a 
predictable future. How to assess such a situation? On the one hand, it is very regrettable that 
negotiations on tariffs, quotas and subsidies will not be pursued in the WTO forum which is, by far, 
the best place to negotiate such issues. On the other hand, the WTO does not seem the best place to 
negotiate in a substantial manner about regulatory issues—be technical norms in goods, regulations 
shaping services markets (trade and investment) intellectual property rights, and to some extent public 
procurement.  
All the WTO Members do not face this ambiguous situation in a similar fashion. Developed and a 
few emerging economies (such as China) which have reduced substantially their tariffs are mostly 
interested in addressing barriers associated to regulatory issues—in particular the barriers in services 
which constitute the lion’s share of modern economies. These WTO Members are not very much 
concerned by the WTO current incapacity to host negotiations on tariff cuts. By contrast, most 
developing and the rest of the emerging economies (such as India) which have still substantial tariffs 
have a lot to lose from an economic point of view from the freeze of the Doha negotiations. 
The main reason for the WTO relative inefficiency in regulatory matters is the absence of trust 
among all the WTO Members: no WTO Member trusts all its 159 WTO partners. Trust is needed to 
overcome two—not one—challenges. First is well known and occurs during the negotiation phase: 
mistrust then flows from the difficulty to assess the level of regulatory protection (that is, the level of 
unjustified restrictions to business generated by regulations) which exists before the negotiations. The 
second challenge occurs after the conclusion of an agreement, hence it is rarely mentioned though it is 
probably the more important: mistrust flows from the even higher difficulty to monitor the fulfilment 
of the regulatory liberalisation commitments by the trading partner. After concluding a trade deal 
covering regulations, the trading partner can change a services regulation (or a technical norm) with 
the best intentions, but can then inadvertently erode the market access negotiated in the deal. This 
situation (unknown in the case of tariffs where each country can easily monitor whether its trading 
partners keep their commitments) creates strong disincentives to negotiate on services when the 
negotiating partners are not trusted. 
The trust argument is the economic justification of the current recourse to preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs).
1
 But, past experiences have also shown the strong limits of PTAs even among 
countries sharing a high level of trust among them. Section 1 illustrates this point with the 
disappointing results of the European Union (EU) “Internal Market”, the EU being a good example of 
a PTA. The too many remaining limits of the EU Internal Market suggest that there has been some 
systemic error in the way it was negotiated—hence they raise the often neglected issue of the quality 
of the negotiating instruments used for concluding deals on regulations. Section 2 examines this issue 
in more detail and shows that the two main negotiating instruments used to build the EU Internal 
Market—harmonization and mutual recognition—are indeed of poor quality for integrating modern 
economies. It also shows that a third instrument—mutual equivalence—is a much more promising 
instrument not only for the EU but also for all the mega-PTAs under negotiations.  
                                                     
*
 Prepared for the 2014 European University Institute conference on the “State of the Union”. An earlier version of this 
paper was presented at the Second East Asia-EU Round Table, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, January 9, 2014. I 
would like to thank very much Max Buege, Bernard Hoekman, Petros Mavroidis and all the participants of the Beijing 
Round Table for their comments. I would also like to thank to Professors Dugkeun Ahn and Taeho Bark, Graduate 
School of International Strudies, Seoul National University, for extremely useful discussions on these issues during my 
stay when I was working on this paper. 
1
 There is a geo-political argument which is the deep disagreement between the US and China on WTO obligations which 
has been the major cause of the collapse of the Doha Round in 2008 [Messerlin 2012]. 
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Section 1. The disappointing results of the EU Internal Market 
This section provides some basic evidence showing that the EU Internal Market is still a very 
fragmented market. The focus on the EU is for pure data convenience: it is due to the fact that there 
are lot of data and evidence on the regulations of the individual Member States of the EU which is the 
oldest PTA aiming to address technical norms, services regulations etc.  
Indeed, evidence based on trade costs suggests that the EU limits are not specific to the EU, but are 
shared by other PTAs [Miroudot and Shepherd 2011]. In the goods sector (Figure 1 left panel), if 
PTAs have definitively reduced trade costs within PTAs compared to those outside PTAs, the intra-
PTA trade costs have not decreased during the first seven years of the 2000s, despite the fact that these 
years should have benefited from the continuous efforts of integration pursued from the 1980s until 
the 2000s. 
Figure 1. Average trade costs within and outside PTAs, goods and services
 
Source: Miroudot and Shepherd 2011. 
In services (Figure 1 right panel), PTAs show definitively very little impact on trade costs among the 
PTA members, compared to non-members. As services are sectors dominated by regulations, this 
observation suggests that the EU—as well as the other PTAs existing in the 2000s such as NAFTA—
has failed to provide the expected deep integration in services. 
The still highly fragmented EU Internal Market in services 
A more detailed information on barriers in services among EU Member States (EUMS) is provided by 
the internationally comparable OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicators [OECD 2014]. 
PMR indicators measure the degree to which competition is inhibited or distorted by regulatory 
barriers, such as legal and administrative barriers to entrepreneurship, state control of business 
enterprises, sector-specific anti-competitive regulations, etc. The indicators range from 0 to 100, with 
0 standing for a completely open market and 100 for a completely closed market.
2
 Table 1 presents the 
available PMR indicators on the EUMS regulatory barriers in key services for the years 2003, 2008 
and 2013. 
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 The initial range of the PMR indicators used is 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive. The range 0 to 100 is used in order to 
have a presentation easier to be read (but it should be stressed that the PMR indicators are not equivalent to tariffs: they 
are mere estimates of the existing regulatory barriers in the services sectors covered).  
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Table 1. Regulatory barriers in EUMS services, 2003-2013 
Notes: [a] Accounting, Architect, Engineer, Legal. The “large” EUMS are Britain, France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain. [b] Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia. [b] Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Slovakia, Sweden and Britain. Source: OECD [2014]. 
Table 1 provides bad news and good news for negotiations in services in the context of PTAs, and 
particularly of “mega-PTAs” among the world largest economies. The bad news is the survival of 
huge differences between the highest and lowest PMR among the EUMS, despite massive integration 
efforts—the so-called Internal Market programme which was supposed to bring down the intra-EU 
barriers consists in more than 600 EU laws (“Directives”). Such differences are the best (though 
indirect) indicator of a still fragmented Internal Market for the following reason: it would make no 
sense for a EUMS to keep high PMR (protection) with respect to non-EU countries if the firms from 
non-EU countries could operate from the low-PMR EUMS without similar intra-EU barriers. In sum, 
there are good reasons to believe that those PMR reflect the true extra- and intra-EU level of 
protection. This first result raises an important question. Does a similar picture prevail in the other 
mammoth economies, such as the US (barriers among US States) China (barriers among Chinese 
provinces) or Japan (barriers among Japanese prefectures)? Anecdotal information suggests this is the 
case. 
The good news is about the dynamics of negotiations of mega-PTAs. The EUMS with low PMR 
are probably as eager to open the markets of the EUMS with the high PMR as any pro-freer trade EU 
trading partner. These low-PMR EUMS will thus look actively for building coalitions with the pro-
freer trade entities (States, Provinces, Prefectures, etc.) of the EU trading partner(s). Of course, the 
same behavior should be expected from the high-PMR EUMS which will try to make alliance with the 
anti-free trade entities of the EU trading partner(s). As a result, negotiating on regulations opens the 
possibility of “trans-negotiating partners” coalitions during these negotiations. 
This configuration does not fit the stereotype of country-to-country conflicts (in case of tariff 
negotiations) and seems to be much more promising in terms of the possible outcome of the 
negotiations. For instance, the negotiations of the EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement could witness a 
coalition of certain Japanese railways companies making an alliance with British railways companies 
for opening the Japanese and EU government procurement markets whereas other Japanese railways 
companies would make an alliance with the French railways company for keeping as closed as 
possible the Japanese and EU government procurement markets.  
In the context of such negotiating dynamics, Table 1 gives an additional interesting observation: 
there is always a large EUMS with a relatively high PMR (except in airlines, and to a lesser extent in 
telecoms). This probably reflects the capture of the whole EU by very few firms from the large 
EUMS. Once again, it would be interesting to know whether the same observation could be done for 
the other largest world economies. 
2003 2008
PMR EUMS PMR EUMS PMR EUMS
Electricity 68 67 54 Estonia 53 France 15 Spain
Gas 89 69 63 Greece 42 France 0 Britain
Post 78 72 56 Slovenia 56 Italy 11 Netherlands
Telecoms 52 38 33 Slovenia 19 Germany 5 Britain
Airlines 82 83 59 Slovenia 8 France 0 5 EUMS [b]
Rail 100 88 81 Ireland 67 Spain 4 Britain
Road 100 71 71 Italy -- -- 25 8 EUMS [c]
Retail 78 76 68 Belgium 53 Italy 10 Sweden
Prof. services [a] 59 50 48 Hungary 44 Germany 9 Sweden
B: Highest PMR in
large EUMS 2013
A: Highest
PMR 2013
Highest PMR C: Lowest
PMR 2013
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The highly fragmented Internal Market in foreign direct investment 
Table 2 presents the foreign investment restrictiveness indicators provided by the OECD Secretariat 
[Koyama and Golub 2006].
3
 It should be specified that these indicators measure the level of 
restrictions against non-EU services providers. Unfortunately, OECD indicators provided since 2006 
do not disaggregate non-EU and intra-EU restrictions—hence they give a rosy picture of the level of 
protection in the EU (that explains that Table 2 does not use OECD data provided since 2006).  
Table 2 provides the same observations on barriers to foreign direct investment than the ones just 
presented on services: wide differences among EUMS which make sense only if the EU Internal 
Market remains highly fragmented. As a result, it also suggests the same dynamics of “trans-
negotiating partners” coalitions during the negotiations of a mega-PTA between the EU and another 
large economy. 
The highly fragmented Internal Market in government procurement 
Also high on the agenda of negotiators of mega-PTAs is the opening of the government procurement 
markets. The recently published World Input-Output Database (WIOD) allows to calculate the 
penetration ratios in government procurement (these ratios are defined as the imports of foreign goods 
and services used in domestic government procurement markets divided by the total public demand in 
government procurement markets). 
Table 2. Regulatory barriers in EUMS foreign direct investment, 2006. 
 
Source: OECD 2006. 
The four panels of Figure 2 provides two main observations. First (top left panel) is the disappointing 
result of intra-EU liberalization of government procurement compared to the extra-EU liberalization 
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 Indicator 0 means no barrier on FDI from non-EU origin for the sector in question. Indicator 1000 means a complete ban on 
FDI from non-EU origin for the sector in question. 
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Belgium 22 22 22 22 72 72 22 22 44 44 22 122 248 72 22
France 233 33 33 33 72 72 22 22 138 94 22 198 198 72 322
Germany 22 22 22 22 122 122 22 22 116 72 22 248 198 22 122
Iraly 22 22 22 22 72 72 22 22 88 144 22 494 66 22 122
Netherlands 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 55 33 11 411 355 11 611
Austria 348 348 348 348 172 172 172 172 272 172 172 322 472 222 172
Denmark 1000 562 22 22 72 72 22 22 44 22 22 422 22 122 122
Finland 550 550 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 160 110 310 210 154 210
Greece 462 506 462 462 122 122 22 22 88 88 22 522 254 22 1000
Ireland 22 22 22 22 122 122 22 22 88 44 22 466 66 22 1000
Portugal 22 66 22 22 122 122 22 22 116 172 22 1000 122 22 122
Spain 512 66 22 22 322 322 22 22 226 182 22 304 316 22 22
Sweden 556 292 66 66 166 166 66 66 116 116 66 316 266 166 166
Britain 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 83 67 17 267 361 17 17
Czech Rep. 125 375 50 50 50 50 100 50 150 150 50 450 100 100 450
Estonia 1000 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 122 22 22 322 366 22 622
Hungary 100 100 100 100 200 100 100 100 150 100 100 500 400 150 200
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 132 0 100 1000
Lithuania 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50 350 94 50 650
Poland 225 175 75 75 375 375 75 75 75 325 75 375 75 125 175
Romania 250 50 50 50 150 150 50 50 50 175 50 750 150 50 450
Slovakia 75 375 75 75 72 72 72 72 172 172 72 372 122 72 322
Slovenia 125 125 100 100 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 740 244 100 700
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for the two major EUMS (France and Germany, or EU2).
4
 Intra-EU openness ratio is not much higher 
than extra-EU ratio. Moreover, there is a clear worsening of this result at the end of the period. In 
short, there is little trace of a differential impact of the EU body of law on the openness ratio in EUMS 
government procurement. 
Second, in 2010-2011, the EU Commission claimed that the extra-EU government procurement 
sector was more open than the government procurement sectors of the EU trading partners. This claim 
is not supported by evidence: China openness ratio (top right panel) has always been higher than the 
joint ratio of France and Germany (the combined GDP of these two EUMS is not too far from the size 
of the Chinese GDP); Japan (bottom left panel) has caught up the openness of the French or German 
economies; and Korea (bottom right panel) is more open than the larger Spain (1.2 times Korea’s GDP 
size) and even than the notably smaller Netherlands (0.7 times Korea’s GDP size).
5
 
Figure 2. Openness ratios in government procurement, selected countries 1995-2008 
Source: WIOD, Messerlin and Miroudot 2012. 
The implementation issue 
Enforcement is essential in regulatory matters. In particular, harmonizing regulations may have very 
little positive impact (if any) if enforcement procedures are not harmonized. In this perspective, it is 
useful to ask two questions: have the EU efforts to create an Internal Market generated relatively 
similar enforcement capabilities in the EUMS? And does one observe some regulatory differences 
between the founding EUMS and the most recent EUMS? Table 3 provides some sense of what has 
                                                     
4
 The same result is also observed for the 18 EUMS of the WOID. But, the accession of many small EUMS in 2004 
introduces some discontinuity over the whole period in favor of high penetration ratios since smaller economies tend to 
be more open than larger economies. 
5
 Bilateral comparisons have to account the size effect (a small economy is likely to open more widely its government 
procurement markets than a large economy) hence the changes of the EU counterparts of the non-EU countries in Figure 
2 panels. 
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happened with a rough indicator—the rank for “Ease of doing business” [World Bank Doing Business 
website].
6
 For answering the second question, EUMS ranks are presented by “EUMS cohorts” 
aggregating EUMS having acceded to the EU the same year  
Table 3 provides two observations. First, emerging or recently developed Asian economies are 
better ranked than a large number of EUMS, including the founding EUMS. Second, some very recent 
EUMS (the Baltic countries, EUMS 2004b) have better ranks than the founding EUMS (EU-1958) 
suggesting that even a PTA like the EU has little impact on the regulatory quality of its members—in 
other words, this regulatory quality is above all a question to be recognized and taken care internally. 
Table 3. Ranks for “Ease of doing business”, selected countries 2012 
 
Notes: EU-1973: Britain, Denmark, Ireland. EU-1995: Austria, Finland, Sweden. EU 2004b: Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania. EU 1958: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands. EU 2004a: Cyprus, Czech 
Rep., Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. EU-1980s: Greece, Portugal, Spain. EC 2007: Bulgaria, Romania. 
Source: Doing Business, World Bank. 
Section 2. Meaningful mega-PTAs require better negotiating instruments 
The limits of the EU Internal Market are so numerous and widely spread across sectors that they 
suggest some systemic mistake in the European integration process. If the enthusiasm for European 
integration did face ups and downs during this period, there was no systematic drag on the whole 
endeavor which could explain so many limits. And, the current mounting resentment with respect to 
the EU endeavor in many EUMS is fuelled by the perception that the EU Internal Market did not 
deliver what was announced, and that it is rather perceived as a source of more constraints and costs 
than of benefits. 
What follows argues that this systemic failure has been the way intra-EU negotiations on norms of 
goods and on services regulations have been conceived. If correct, this explanation is of great interest 
for deepening the EU Internal Market, but also for the coming negotiations of all the mega-PTAs, and 
especially of those between East Asia and the EU. This is because these mega-PTAs deal with the 
                                                     
  
EUMS Rank Partner Rank
Singapore 1
EU-1973 7
Korea 8
Canada 13
Malaysia 18
EU-1995 19
Japan 20
EU-2004b 24
C. Taipei 25
EU-1958 41
EU-2004a 50
EU-1980s 58
EU-2007 66
China 91
Argentina 113
Russia 120
Brazil 126
India 132
EU Members States by 
cohort
EU Partners
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same key issue than the Internal Market—how to negotiate on regulations, be technical norms for 
industrial and agricultural goods or regulations shaping markets in services. In short, the Internal 
Market programme was a “21st century” trade agreement. 
The key question is: Which is the most efficient instrument for negotiating on regulations? After 
all, the history of tariff negotiations of the last 150 years has been the history of mastering 
progressively more efficient techniques for tariff cuts. And it amply shows that inefficient negotiating 
procedures and instruments (requests and offers on tariff cuts on a product basis, tariff-rate quotas, 
etc.) are not only unable to bring the expected benefits from market opening, but—much worse—can 
even deliver distorted, hence costly, liberalizations. 
The basic question: the value of regulatory differences in modern economies 
There are two radically different ways to look at regulatory differences [Messerlin 2011]. The first 
view—probably the most widely accepted—is that regulatory differences are “bad” because they 
impose more costs on foreign producers than on domestic firms in the domestic market. Such “unfair” 
differences should thus be eliminated or reduced as much as possible by appropriate legal 
mechanisms. This first view insists on a (somewhat mythical) level plain field. It is entirely focusing 
on producers. 
The second view is that regulatory differences are “good” because they reflect different “varieties” 
in supplied goods or services. More varieties increase the consumers’ welfare because they offer them 
more choices. This second view is consumer-driven. In such a context, regulators concerned about 
consumers’ welfare should welcome regulatory differences. Accordingly, they should focus their 
attention on assessing the “equivalence” of competing regulations from the consumers’ viewpoint (for 
instance, safety).  
Interestingly, this consumer-driven approach is based on a landmark ruling of the EU Court of 
Justice (the so-called 1979 “Cassis de Dijon” case). This case did echo the wide perception in the EU 
in the 1960s and 1970s that the major achievement of the EU Internal Market was not prices 
decreases, but the huge increase in the diversity of products (varieties)—such as Italian low-end cars 
competing with high-end German cars and middle-end French cars. 
Not surprisingly, the producer-driven and consumer-driven approaches are on a collision course. 
The first approach aims to limit differences, hence choices for the consumers—and competition 
among producers. The second approach aims to keep as large as possible choices among varieties, 
hence differences among regulations since varieties and regulations are somewhat inter-active (some 
regulations favour some varieties which then call from some regulations for further development).  
Three basic instruments are available for negotiating on norms: “harmonization”, “mutual 
recognition” and “mutual equivalence”. Sometimes, negotiators have recourse to the notion of 
“regulatory convergence”. However, this notion is generally a weak form of harmonization postponed 
in an undefined future: harmonization is not possible now, but it is “hoped” that it will occur over 
time. 
What follows tries to assess the respective merits of the three basic instruments in the context of 
mega-PTAs negotiations. For brevity sake, what follows does not always develop the arguments at the 
two levels required: the design per se of the regulation, and the implementation of the designed 
regulation—for instance, defining a technical norm and designing the certification process ensuring 
the respect of the new norm.  
Patrick Messerlin 
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Harmonisation: unfounded assumptions 
It seems fair to say that harmonization still remains the preferred negotiating instrument for most 
negotiators dealing with mega-PTAs. However, looking at harmonization as the best negotiating 
instrument on regulations relies on three unfounded assumptions. 
 Firstly, there would always exist a technical norm unambiguously superior to all its alternatives. 
This assumption does not fit modern economies characterized by a huge number of varieties for 
almost every product and by two decades of intensive norm setting, as best illustrated by a recent 
EU case in the car sector (see Box1). A norm can be better from one point of view, and not from 
another. What is true for technical norms is even truer for services regulations. Comparing 
services regulations suggests that very few regulatory features have an unambiguously detrimental 
impact on the efficient provision of a service. 
 Secondly, harmonization would be a science-driven process. In reality, harmonization is a heavily 
loaded political process where firms try to avoid increased competition and where negotiators are 
instructed to fight for their national champions. Such a process is largely driven by the negotiating 
leverage of the countries and firms. Hence, it is far to guarantee the choice of an intrinsically 
‘best’ norm (assuming that such a norm exists) and it is a source of ultimate disillusions for most 
firms since, when a firm asks for harmonization, it is generally about harmonization based on its 
own norms. This is because firms imposing their norms as the harmonized ones keep intact their 
human (technical and legal) capital while the other firms will have to rebuild their human capital 
(learn how to use the new techniques and the new regulations and certification process). 
 Last but not least, harmonised norms would raise relatively negligible implementation problems. 
In reality, implementation—such as the certification of the conformity of a product to a 
harmonized norm—raises very severe problems. First, harmonised norms delivering small gains 
(for the above-mentioned reasons) coupled with a costly (certification) enforcement are not 
desirable from a welfare point of view. Second, there is a powerful force for a never-ending 
increase in the harmonization of the certification procedures themselves when this option was not 
necessarily envisaged initially (as in the EU car sector with EU harmonized norms and EUMS 
certification procedures). All these unexpected and increasing costs on the producers and 
consumers are an essential component of the current resentment against the EU endeavour. 
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Box 1. The battle of the EU air coolants, 2006-2013 
 
The EU car industry is one of the very few sectors mostly covered by the harmonization 
approach which went in much details on rear mirrors size, colour and locations of the lights, 
etc. In 2006, the EU Directive 2006/40/EC banned the air coolant R134a on the basis of 
pollution level and imposed a less polluting alternative R1234yf for all the cars to be 
produced in Europe after 2012. However, later Daimler engineers discovered that the new 
coolant R1234yf was much more flammable than the old one. As a result, Daimler refused to 
introduce the new coolant in its 2013 Mercedes cars. The German Federal Office in charge of 
car safety agreed with Daimler’s analysis and granted to Daimler an authorization to sell cars 
with the old coolant in Germany and in the EU.  
 
Then, the French government, supported by the EU Commissioner for Industry, decided to 
ban the sales of Daimler cars in France. After some fights between EU, French and German 
regulators, the Conseil d’Etat (the highest administrative Court in France) ordered to resume 
the sales of Mercedes in France. At the time of writing, the two coolants are now used in the 
EU—mirroring the absence of an unequivocally superior norm. 
 
In January 2014, the EU Commission announced legal action against Germany. It also asked 
the Joint Research Council (JRC) to provide impartial scientific advice in what was described 
as "a confidence-building measure". However, the JRC is a Directorate General of the 
Commission funded at more than 85 percent by Commission’s money. As a result, its March 
2014 conclusion that the R1234yf is safe is unlikely to close the ongoing debate.  
 
Indeed, this latest event raises two debates: 
 * First is a technical and legal battle on the cooling case and, more generally, on the role of 
norms in a modern economy and society. 
 * The second debate goes even further and deeper. It deals with the question of the 
appropriate institutions required by a much needed “culture of evaluation in a world 
environment”. There is a need to think about the “separation of powers” between the 
evaluating branch and the normative branch of any institution, such as the European 
Commission. This debate is crucial for future economically-sound trade negotiations that take 
fully into account global value chains [Hoekman 2014]. 
Finally, there is a last argument against harmonization in the current context of competing mega-
PTAs. It is hard to see how US and EU negotiators could harmonise norms or regulations in the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) context, while EU and Japanese negotiators 
will do it in the Japan-EU Free Trade Agreement, and Japanese and US negotiators in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) context. An illustration of such impasses is provided by the car industry. In 
the Japan-EU trade negotiations, the Japanese car-makers have expressed their willingness to use 
norms derived from the UN-ECE norms (European norms defined under the UN umbrella). This move 
makes almost impossible the use of harmonization between the EU and the US and between Japan and 
the US in the car sector. Hence, it requires having recourse to one of the two other instruments for 
negotiating the norm issue in the car sector between the US on the one hand, and the EU and Japan on 
the other hand. 
To sum up, harmonization in the mega-PTA context does not look an economically-sound and 
promising negotiating instrument, except in special cases all the more because it is hard to see all these 
mammoth economies ready to give up their existing and future regulations. 
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Mutual recognition: an unstable and disappointing hybrid 
In the late 1960s to mid-1980s, the EU tried hard to harmonize EU technical norms and services 
regulations in the Internal Market context. It was a frustrating failure: only four industrial sectors got 
their harmonized technical norms, and almost none in services. Shifting from unanimity to qualified 
majority for adopting harmonized regulations did not solve the problem.  
The EU decided thus to shift to a new instrument—“mutual recognition” (MR)—inspired by the 
key 1979 Cassis de Dijon ruling of the European Court of Justice. MR means that each party accepts 
the norms of its partner for the goods at stake conditionally upon the adoption of a “core” of common 
provisions or principles (“essential requirements” in the EU legal jargon).
7
 MR is thus an hybrid 
instrument: the core has to be harmonized through negotiations, and only the other provisions are 
subject to mutual recognition. From 1979 to 2006, MR was the exclusive approach used by the EU for 
dismantling barriers caused by unjustified regulations and for building the EU Internal Market. It has 
been also widely used in international agreements. 
MR has rapidly shown its limits: as the “core” is harmonized, the whole MR approach suffers from 
the limits attached to harmonization. Political pressures fuelled by anti-competitive business pressures 
created, then tend to expand over time the core provisions (for instance, the number of words defining 
the core in the EU Toys Safety Directive has increased 1.6 times over time).  
As a result, MR is subjected to intrinsic forces drifting it over time ever closer to harmonisation. In 
the EU, this evolution has been accelerated by the accusations of certain EUMS against the ‘regulatory 
dumping’ of other EUMS which were allegedly adopting a ‘loose’ interpretation of the core 
provisions. These accusations have been dealt with by imposing increasingly tight constraints on 
certifications procedures. In the rest of the world, MR (MR+) has rarely solved the problem of very 
costly double certification requirements—but in very special cases such as aircraft bodies (a situation 
probably more due to the strong duopoly of Airbus and Boeing and their intricate value chains, than to 
the influence of the regulatory bodies).  
“Mutual equivalence”: the promising instrument 
Mutual equivalence (ME) means that, for a given product or in a given service, each party recognizes 
the partner’s norms for a given product or regulations for a given service, and possibly the 
implementation (certification) process, as fully equivalent to its own norms or regulations, and 
certification processes. For instance, cars produced under US norms and certified by US bodies could 
be sold in the EU with no additional procedure—and conversely for cars produced under EU norms 
and certified by EU bodies in the US market. 
To be politically acceptable, ME requires a systematic preliminary step: a joint process of ‘mutual 
evaluation’ of the norms and regulations at stake by the two partners. This step can be done only by 
the regulators of the two parties—not by the trade negotiators. It has two critical features. It is a 
decisive trust-building process among regulators—hence consumers. And it is an insurance 
mechanism: when reforming its norm or regulation once a PTA is implemented, a party will be careful 
not to breach the reasons (safety, health, etc.) which have justified the adoption of the norm or the 
regulation—hence the ME status (if agreed). In other words, the ME approach has a built-in “anti-race 
to the bottom” component. If the two parties decide not to decide to use the ME approach, then the 
norms or regulations under investigation could be still negotiated under mutual recognition or 
harmonization 
At a first glance, ME seems a totally new instrument. But actually, it has been implemented on a 
large scale in the Australia-New Zealand Trans-Tasmanian Agreement on norms for goods [Laplagne 
                                                     
7
 In the EU jargon, MR covers both the regulation per se and the certification (implementation) process. In the WTO 
jargon, MR refers only to regulations, while “MR+” covers the certification process. 
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2010]. It is also the basis of the EU 2006 Services Directive in services—the only EU Directive which 
covers a very wide range of services, from logistics to hotels to retail, etc. It is also present in the 2012 
EU-US “Organic Equivalence Cooperation Arrangement” on organic food. And, it has been suggested 
for the car sector in the EU-US context since some time [Morall 2011]. 
One may wonder why such a simple approach as ME has not yet been widely adopted (in particular 
within the EU) whereas, as argued above, the joint evaluation process offers a strong guarantee that 
there will be no “race to the bottom”. The most convincing answer seems the following one: ME 
increases the level of competition among firms—and indeed among countries’ regulatory bodies. As 
any pro-competitive instrument, it maximizes the welfare of the consumers of the negotiating 
countries—but at the “cost” of more competition among firms and regulators which then collude to 
minimize the use of this instrument. 
Last but not least, the ME requires the participation of the partner’s regulating bodies in the 
negotiating process—something which is generally missing in PTAs negotiations. Indeed, it suggests 
some specialisation between trade negotiators and sectoral regulators. Trade negotiators would provide 
broad areas of goods and services to be considered as candidates for the MR approach. Regulators in 
charge of these sectors will then undertake the mutual evaluation process and makes the final decision 
on the ME status, including clarifications, exceptions or reviews to be done for getting this status. The 
EU Services Directive even suggests some ideas on how to combine trade negotiators and sectoral 
regulators, as illustrated by Box 2. Such a process offers an unique opportunity to build, restore or 
improve trust among the signatories—in particular, if it includes systematic reviews of the situation at 
definite periods of time. 
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Box 2. A model for combining trade negotiators and regulators: The 2006 EU Services 
Directive 
 
Two articles of this Directive are particularly useful for today PTAs negotiations. Article 14 
lists provisions in the existing regulations of the partners which represent indisputable barriers 
to market access (nationality clause, obligation to have an establishment in more than one 
location, etc.). This list could guide the trade negotiators for picking the goods and services as 
possible candidates for ME status. 
 
Article 15 draws the list of the provisions that should be mutually evaluated (quantitative or 
territorial restrictions, requirements on shareholding, etc.) because they have the potential to 
restrict market access, a point to be clarified or amended before being covered by a mutual 
equivalence agreement. This list defines the typical content of the topics to be subjected to 
mutual evaluation by the regulators of the negotiating countries. 
 
Last but not least, it is essential to note that Article 15 changes the perspective on 
liberalization and its dynamics: it is not so much liberalization that counts than the dynamics 
of better regulation that should go with it. In short, Article 15 takes a trade agreement for 
what it should be: an opportunity for each signatory to improve its domestic regulations. 
Concluding remarks 
The paper has first surveyed the limits of the EU Internal Market as a good illustration of the limits of 
any PTA relying on the current negotiating instruments dealing with regulations—technical norms for 
goods, regulations shaping markets for services. The second section has identified a more promising 
negotiating instrument: mutual equivalence. Mutual equivalence fits better than harmonization and 
mutual recognition the need of modern economies characterized by a wide diversity (varieties) of 
products; it increases the competitive pressures among the firms of the PTA members; and it reduces 
the trade distortions (trade diversion) generated by PTA with respect to the rest of the world by 
inducing PTA signatories to be “norm-attracting”—not “norm-setting”. As it requires a thorough 
preliminary step of mutual evaluation of their regulations by the negotiating parties, it is an 
indispensable instrument in a context of an international trade increasingly dominated by value added 
chains [Hoekman 2014]. 
The success of the ongoing negotiations on mega-PTAs will thus largely depend on their ability to 
deal with regulations. This is particularly true for the current and future mega-PTAs involving the EU: 
Japan’s tariffs are extremely low, and peaks are rare (except for a few agricultural products); China’s 
tariffs are higher than Japan’s, but they are still moderate (often lower than EU’s tariffs) and the share 
of tariff peaks is limited—a consequence of the very demanding Protocol of Accession imposed on 
China in 2001; the same could be said for Taiwan. Paradoxically, it may be the US tariffs that could 
raise the most difficult problems, a testimony of the leniency of the GATT-WTO regime to the 
founding Members. The key for success is thus the negotiators’ ability to combine harmonization, 
mutual recognition and mutual equivalence depending the negotiated topics. For instance, in the case 
of the Japan-EU PTA, harmonization may emerge as the preferred solution by the Japanese car-
makers, but mutual equivalence may prevail for buses or trucks. The main consequence of such 
detailed complexities is the urgent need to get an active involvement of the regulating bodies, in 
addition to the traditional negotiating teams. In short, far to mean a decline in the “sovereignty” of the 
negotiating countries, the current and future negotiations on mega-PTAs require a healthy and robust 
evaluation of the quality of their own governance by the negotiating countries. They require much 
“smarter” countries. 
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Last but not least, what will happen if the negotiators of the mega-PTAs are unable to use the best 
negotiating instruments—such as tariff cuts (no tariff-quotas) and a dose large enough of mutual 
equivalence? In such a case, the economic benefits of too limited mega-PTAs may not be large enough 
to counter-balance their political costs for inducing the top-politicians of the two countries to invest 
their political capital in a PTA success. One is slowly rediscovering one of the key feature of the WTO 
multilateral forum: its capacity to “dissolve” bilateral political conflicts into a worldwide negotiation. 
Any government could pretend to negotiate with friendly countries in the WTO while talking also with 
its political foes. By contrast, bilateral negotiations re-activate political “ghosts” and prejudices among 
two countries. And they do so all the more the partner is a large country. 
In this context, it will not be astonishing that, after years of too difficult bilateral negotiations, the 
trade negotiators of the large countries may go back quietly to Geneva. For instance, the Trade in 
Services Agreement (TiSA) would be an available forum for negotiations in services. The economic 
benefits will be increased—not because of the use of the best negotiating instrument (ME), but 
because the second-best instrument (harmonization or MR) would be used in an enlarged 
framework—two dozen of countries and probably a wider set of services. At the same time, the 
political troubles carried by bilaterals will be largely dissolved. In short, the test of the mega-PTAs 
success is whether the TiSA negotiations will be intense, or not. If they are, it will be a sure sign that 
mega-PTAs negotiations will have hung fired. 
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